이 부분에서 주목할 것은 interactivity를 ideologic 하게 해석하는 방식. not technologically.
그리고 Faux-phenomenology에 대한 부분은 활용가능할 것 같다.
결국 기존의 site work에서 viewer는 그야말로 viewer였지, participant는 아니었다고 보고 있다.
the viewer‟s role is not as a creative participant but as, precisely, a viewer. The viewer walks through the site and among its constituent parts or objects, but leaves no lasting mark of her presence on the artwork: her “interactivity” is limited to a spatial exploration of the site in question.(110)
viewers can be thought of co-habiting the site with the artwork, so to speak, but not co-authoring it.(111)
In an essay titled Strategies of Interactivity Dieter Daniels asks the question whether interactivity is an ideology or a technology. He follows the argument through two key periods: the 1960s, which demonstrates an emphasis on social interactivity, and the 1990s, which demonstrates an emphasis on technological interactivity. He makes a pointed comparison between John Cage and Bill Gates: “Cage‟s concept of interactivity stems from an aesthetic and ideology leading to the dissolution of the boundary between author, performance and audience;” by contrast, “Microsoft treats human users like it does computers: it programs them.”233 Cage‟s approach can be considered “bottom-up” in that it allows the musicians the freedom to modify the structure,234 whereas Microsoft‟s concept of interactivity is “top-down” in that the users of the programs work in line with the patterns of interaction established by the software company.235 Daniels concludes that,
Lev Manovich는 모든 HCI가 기본적으로 interactive interface이기 때문에 미디어 아트가 interactive한지를 논하는 거 자체가 무의미하다고 하지만, 이건 다소 too broad.
Lev Manovich offers a useful summary of HCI:
In relation to computer-based media, the concept of interactivity is a tautology. Modern HCI is by definition interactive. In contrast to earlier interfaces such as batch processing, modern HCI allows the user to control the computer in real-time by manipulating information displayed on the screen. Once an object is represented in a computer, it automatically becomes interactive. Therefore, to call computer media “interactive” is meaningless – it simply means stating the most basic fact about computers.238 (112-113)
Arguably interactive art is more “active” than a static objet d’art; however, this activity is still subject to the parameters of the artist or programmer. With regard to the later, many media critics have addressed the implications of “top down” programming. 결국 여전히 진정한 interactive는 아님
Allucquère Rosanne Stone argues that the “electronic instantiation of a particular definition freezes the conceptual framework of interaction in a form most suitable for commercial development – the user moves the cursor to the appropriate place and clicks the mouse, which causes something to happen”251 – poke-and-see technology. (116)
OLAFUR ELIASSON <NOTION MOTION>
In these “devices for the experience of reality,”259 as he calls them, or alternatively, “phenomena-producers,”260 Eliasson illustrates the promiscuous exchange between the real and the virtual that defines the contemporary moment. .. However, Eliasson‟s two descriptions are not interchangeable: the first suggests an essential being that can have the “experience” and an equally certain external “reality.” By contrast, “phenomena-producer” suggests no such philosophical grounding. …it establishes a productive tension between the two – between a phenomenological experience of a virtual world and the all too real devices that produced it. (119)
이 작업의 진가는 이러한 productive tension에서 나온다고 본다 좋은 point.
there is a feedback loop between the image on the screen and the viewer-cum-participant that binds them together into a new combinatory entity. (120)
on one side, the viewer‟s movement is integrated into the image-space; on the other, her movement is stilled in favour of conceptual clarity. (121)
As such, Notion motion is an example of what Lev Manovich calls “metarealism:”
Like classical ideology, classical realism demands that the subject completely accept the illusion for as long as it lasts. In contrast, the new metarealism is based on oscillation between illusion and its destruction, between immersing a viewer in illusion and directly addressing her… The user invests in the illusion precisely because she is given control over it.262 (122)
On a similar note Oliver Grau asserts that interactivity within art projects is often subordinate to immersion, rather than being its equal counterpart. His words are worth citing again:
Although today the audience can exert its creative powers over the image, this control is counterweighed by the highly suggestive powers of the image itself. Maybe we are regaining a relation to the image that reaches far back into precivilized history, giving it a power that transcends a psychic as well as physical boundaries and enables us to regress, leading to an ecstatic symbiosis of onlooker and image.263 (122)
In other words, rather than peering into an illusionistic space from outside its frame, the viewer/user becomes fused with the simulated reality itself in “ecstatic symbiosis.” Their “control” is thus relinquished to the overpowering illusion.
이제는 interactivity가 immersion에 종속적인 위치가 되었고, 따라서 어떠한 ecstatic symbiosis를 통해서 그 설치 환경 자체와 관객이 융합되고, 관객의 control은 rather, illusionary immerson에 포섭된다고 본다.
Mieke Bal describes this dynamic well in an essay on an earlier version of Notion motion:
…no longer representing movement, relying on the viewer to mimic it, the installation makes it “real.” The viewer is inside movement yet also makes it. Suddenly there is that tension, that unsettling sense of the self as necessarily related to “your intuitive surroundings” (of which the painter could only create the illusion). Yet, in spite of the presence of actual water, nothing is real. The rivalry does not concern the sun and the sea, all of this is artificial, theatrical.264 (123)
However, the theatricality that Bal evokes does not beckon the discursive mode of address that Michael Fried had in mind in 1967; rather, it binds the viewer in what Manovich calls a “narcissistic condition.” He argues that
most new media, regardless of whether it represents to the user her image or not, can be said to activate the narcissistic condition because they represent to the user her actions and their results. In other words, it functions as a new kind of mirror that reflects not only the human image but human activities. This is a different kind of narcissism – not of passive contemplation but action.265 (124)
LIGHT에 대한 부분 good
As Geert Lovink remarks, “Light – the symbol of physics, rationalism, the spectacle, of heaven and eternity – is a funny substance to play with. It is abstract yet visible, bringing clarity while retaining its religious dimensions.”272
Ken Hillis discusses metaphors of light as they changed over the centuries, starting with the “primordial view of the world as darkness and light” and Plato‟s later repositioning of light as a metaphysical truth “conceptually withdrawn from the kosmos.”273 Hillis then turns to Augustine‟s differentiation between divine Lumen and earthly Lux, and between intellectual vision and physiological sight, with the value placed on the former. With the Enlightenment came the assertion that “humans also constitute a light source,” an “illuminating source of the Good.”274 By contrast, earlier medieval Neoplatonist mystics sought “to be flooded by the universal light of God, a state of „direct perception‟ achievable only by suspending the reflexivity and critical distance that normal cognition operating within a cultural milieu provides.”275
Hillis argues that many aspects of these philosophies of light still resound in today‟s virtual environments, especially the idea of suspending cultural awareness in order to “directly” perceive a mystical truth. Most relevant to Notion motion is his observation that,
In Neoplatonic fashion, users look into a virtual world composed of light. However, by then relocating a part of these individuals‟ sense of self to an icon located both in and of the light, VR collapses the Neoplatonic distance between light and self. …by positioning the seer of and in the light, as both wherein and illuminated, VR goes beyond the stereoscope to suggest a transcendent doubling: both it and that part of the seer‟s iconised self „within‟ the technology might now form a natural place.276 이 부분 적용 가능 (127)
“Technology is not only a mechanical engine: it has changed the way we see reality.”280 (130)
As Rosalind Krauss observes of one of Viola‟s artworks, “Once physical space is converted to psychological space… (notice I‟m not say phenomenological space), all connection to the reality of his artistic means is dissolved.” (130)
이 지점으로부터 Faux-phenomenology이야기가 나오게 된다. Eliasson + Turrell의 작업 비슷하게 적용 가능.
Hal Foster derisively calls “faux-phenomenology,” which he describes as “experience reworked, keyed up, given back to us in a very mediated fashion – as immediate, spiritual, absolute.”282 (131)
This paradox between its form (a medium that aims to be immediate) and its content (the mediation of nature) is what characterizes Eliasson‟s “return of phenomenology”284 as faux: it operates at the third remove. That is, it is not about the nature of our perceptions, but rather, it is about the mediated nature of perceptions about mediated perceptions. “Real” phenomenology, by contrast is precisely not removed but “primary:” In Krauss‟ influential reading of Maurice Merleau-Ponty‟s Phenomenology of Perception, she illustrates how perceptual “truth” and cognitive “truth” are irreconcilable, as there are certain phenomena (especially those of one‟s own body) that the mind cannot correlate.285 (131)
Notion motion, however, allows an escape from the primary world by absorbing the body into the image. (132)
Thus in Turrell‟s and Eliasson‟s installation alike, “faux-phenomenology” borders on the oceanic: the viewer‟s experience is allegedly pre- or extra-linguistic and her body is posited as pre-differentiation. (132)